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2Abstract
The opportunity to make a better life is enshrined in democratic societies. In
recent decades the growth in personal freedom and the rhetoric of the
knowledge economy have led many to believe that we have more
opportunities than ever before. We are told that the trade-off between
efficiency and justice no longer holds in a global knowledge-driven economy,
as the opportunity to exploit the talents of all, at least in the developed world,
is now a realistic goal. This article will challenge such accounts of education,
opportunity and global labour market. It points to enduring social inequalities in
the competition for a livelihood and an intensification of ‘positional’ conflict.
Our ‘opportunities’ are becoming harder to cash in. The opportunity-cost is
increasing because the pay-off depends on getting ahead in the competition
for tough entry jobs. Middle class families in competitive hot spots are
adopting increasingly desperate measures to win a positional advantage. But
the opportunity trap is not only a problem for individuals or families. It exposes
an inherent tension, if not contradiction, in the relationship between capitalism
and democracy. It will be argued that the legitimate foundations of opportunity,
based on education, jobs and rewards is unravelling. Within education, this not
only represents further symptoms of the ‘diploma disease’ but a social
revolution that fundamentally challenges our understanding of education,
efficiency and social justice.
3Introduction
The opportunity to make a better life is enshrined in democratic societies. It is
one of the few constants in a maelstrom of technological, economic and social
change. Virtually everyone believes in it. It does not rob the rich and offers
hope to the poor. It has been the social glue that binds the ambitions of
diverse peoples. In recent decades the growth in personal freedoms and high
skilled jobs, have led many to believe that we have more opportunities that
every before. We are told that the trade-off between efficiency and justice no
longer holds in a global knowledge-driven economy, as the opportunity to
exploit the talents of all, at least in the developed world, is in prospect.
Such ideas have pushed education to the centre-stage of social and economic
policy agenda. Within the OECD, widening access, raising standards and
further investment in education are believed to deliver opportunity, prosperity
and justice. The growing importance attached to educational credentials
symbolises a tightening bond between education, jobs and rewards. We are
told that ‘the more we learn the more we earn’, as better credentials are
believed to lead to good jobs and higher rewards, at the same time offering an
efficient and fair means of selection based on individual achievement.
Credentials are the currency of opportunity.1
This paper challenges such accounts of education and the labour market in a
global economy. It points to social inequalities in the competition for a
livelihood and an intensification of ‘positional’ conflict (Hirsch, 1977; Brown,
2000). Expectations of middle class lifestyles and careers have risen within
affluent societies and with more women entering the competition for
managerial and professional work. These expectations have been fuelled by
the rise of mass higher education that is sucking more people into already
congested labour markets for elite jobs. Moreover, free market policies have
heightened the importance of finding waged work as welfare provision has
been cut and the stakes attached to winning and losing have increased with a
widening of wage inequalities, especially in the Anglo-Saxon economies,
including the United States and Britain (Brown and Lauder, 2001).
The personal costs incurred in realising our ‘opportunities’ are increasing
because success depends on getting ahead in the competition for tough entry
schools, universities and jobs. Middle class families are adopting more
desperate measures to win a positional advantage. They are having to run
faster, for longer, just to stand still (Boudon, 1974).2 Yet if all adopt the same
tactics nobody gets ahead. But if one does not play the game, there is little
chance of winning. This is the opportunity trap as few can afford to opt out of
the competition for a livelihood.3 Moreover, the opportunity trap is not
4restricted to finding initial employment, it has become lifelong. There are few
labour market shelters from the ‘risk’ culture of global capitalism (Beck, 1992).
Insecurity has been democratised, as the competition for career advancement
has intensified in ‘lean’ organisations constantly looking to reduce labour
costs. In the absence of permanent employment, people are being force to
exploit their ‘opportunities’ for permanent employability (Kanter,  1995; Carnoy,
2000).
The opportunity trap is not only a problem for individuals or families. It exposes
an inherent tension, if not contradiction, in the relationship between capitalism
and democracy. Opportunity, delivered through expanding education and
social mobility has kept the democratic dream of individual achievement and
social justice alive throughout the twentieth century, at the same time as
fulfilling the imperatives of economic growth. This paper will argue that the
legitimate foundations of opportunity, based on  education, jobs and rewards is
unravelling. Within education, this not only represents further symptoms of the
diploma disease (Dore, 1976), but a social revolution that fundamentally
challenges our understanding of education, efficiency and social justice.
Education, Opportunity and Positional Competition
Within the social sciences there is a vast literature that has demonstrated
long-term patterns of inequalities in educational and occupational opportunity.
This research has made an invaluable contribution to our understanding of
education and social stratification. But the root cause of the problems
identified in this article cannot be explained solely in terms of how socially
disadvantaged groups enter the competition for a livelihood on unequal terms.
We must return to a consideration of the role of education in the social
structure of competition.
Durkheim (1956) believed that the education system has two key roles. The
socialisation of the young into society, including preparation for their future
adult roles, and selection into the occupational structure based on individual
achievement. The rise of the credential over the last century owes a lot to the
fact that it captures elements of both. On the one hand, the credential
represent a measure of the quality of educational experience. It signifies the
acquisition of knowledge (at least on the day of the examination). On the other
hand, the credential is a way of judging relative, as well as absolute,
performance. Therefore, over the last century, as employers have extended
the use of credentials to screen potential employees, they were also seen by
some as a way of extending opportunities to all.4
5Fred Hirsch describes this dual quality of education in the following terms,
‘There is an absolute dimension, in which quality is added by receptive
students, good teachers, good facilities, and so on; but there is also a relative
dimension, in which quality consists of the differential over the educational
level attained by others.’ (1977: 6). This leads him to conclude that ‘To the
extent that education is a screening device…the possibility of general
advancement is an illusion’ (p.6).5 The same is true of the labour market where
the opportunities for good jobs can be increased through the upgrading of
skills within the workforce, but at the same time it functions to allocate job
seekers within a hierarchy of jobs, offering different working conditions,
incomes and social status.
To further our understanding of this duality we can say that the absolute
dimension refers to the performance imperatives of individuals, institutions or
societies. This highlights the way schools, companies or governments try to
meet their goals, by improving the quality of teaching, learning and
examination results, through raising productivity and profit margins or through
increasing economic growth. While positional imperatives refer to relative
performance, to how one stands compared to others within an implicit or
explicit hierarchy (Hirsch, 1977). Again, this can refer to individuals,
organisations or nations, such as when universities or companies seek to
enhance their reputational capital (Brown et al. 2003), or national governments
their international economic competitiveness. Scarcity value is an inherent
feature of positional goods, such as credentials.
Therefore, opportunities can be extended by widening access and through
improving the quality of teaching and learning, but as long as the educational
system has a selective role, inequalities in outcome are inevitable. This is a key
point as it recognises that equality of outcome is impossible, if we mean by this
that everyone ends up with similar credentials or jobs. Within the social sciences
‘equality of opportunity’ usually refers to the degree to which the distribution of
education, qualifications or jobs reflects the class, gender and ethnic make-up of
society (Halsey, 1975; Arnot, et al., 1999). It is for this reason that social mobility
studies frequently refer to odds ratios (Marshall et al.,1997). Hence, the rhetoric
of expanding educational opportunities should not disguise the fact that the value
of credentials is strengthened by exclusion and weakened by inclusion. Success
is meaningless without failure. While we can all be encouraged to do our best,
we cannot all be the best.
Any weakening of the selective value of credentials would simply mean that
selection is delayed until entry into the labour market where candidates would
be screened and sorted by other criteria. Indeed, as the hierarchy of jobs has
become more differentiated the impact of selection on life chances has grown.
Our understanding of these issues has also been challenged by trends in
economic globalisation. To date, education and labour market opportunities
6have been based on ‘closed’ competitions limited by national boundaries
(Brown and Lauder, 2001). The nature of opportunity in a context of increasing
globalisation will be discussed in the following discussion.
To advance this discussion we will contrast two theories of education and
labour market opportunities. Within the social sciences the positional quality of
education has been widely acknowledged. The main focus has been on
whether the competition for credentials is fair and efficient (Bell, 1978). A large
body of research has highlighted persistent inequalities in the competition for a
livelihood and patterns of social mobility based on class, gender and race.
Although writers such as Herrnstein and Murray (1994) in America and
Saunders (1995) in Britain have argued that much of these differences in
academic performance can be explained in terms of innate rather than social
inequalities. We begin with positional consensus theory as it captures many of
the ideas that inform ‘official’ international policy debates. Here positional
competition is not interpreted as a source of social conflict but of social justice
and cohesion.
Positional Consensus Theory
The global integration of financial markets; advances in information and
communication technologies; corporate restructuring; and the increasing
significance of multinational companies within the world economy, all herald a
transformation in the means of production, where knowledge, skills, and
human capital are seen to be more important that capital or natural resources
(Drucker, 1993; Stewart, 2001). Societies can be defined by their ‘stage’ of
technological development, as it is technological innovation that is viewed as
the driving force of social change.6 Today, the shift towards a knowledge-
based economy represents a further, more complex, stage in the technological
evolution of capitalist economies.
Therefore, the more technologically advanced a society becomes the greater
the demand for technical, scientific and professional workers who require
extensive periods of formal education and training, whilst the proportion of
semi- and unskilled jobs declines over time (Kerr et al.1973). The rapid
expansion of higher education since mid-century reflects the exponential
increase in scientific and technical knowledge, which has led to greater
investment in tertiary education to supply the ‘knowledge’ workers required in
today’s economy.
It is also argued that the technological upgrading of the economy is
characterized by high rates of social mobility because inequalities in the
opportunity to advance within the education and employment are inconsistent
7with the assignment of occupational roles: 'Industrialisation…is against
tradition and status based upon family, class, religion, race, or caste.' (Kerr et
al. 1973:53). The political determination to achieve economic efficiency and
social justice is reflected in what Parsons (1959) described as the 'axis of
achievement' in industrial societies. Here, efficiency and justice are seen to
work with the grain of knowledge capitalism. It is concluded that getting the
most talented people into senior managerial, professional and executive
positions has become even more crucial as the knowledge base of the
economy expands.
The role of the labour market is to match the supply and demand for technical
skills and competence, based on objective measures of future productive
capacity. Technological progression will lead to a growing numbers of workers
establishing technical, managerial and professional careers, which had
previously been restricted to a small elite. This involves a further
democratisation of capitalism. In the previous era, power and control were
almost exclusively in the hands of employers. Some entered white-collar work
in large private or public organisation that offered the prospect of career
progression based on time-serving and sponsorship by senior managers. This
ensured a high degree of dependency on the company as career progression
depended on long-term loyalty to the company. Today, there has been a
power shift because intellectual capital can no longer be controlled by
organisations. This has led to a significant increase in the economic power of
knowledge professionals. Thus the knowledge-driven economy not only
transforms the nature of work but also transforms the nature of capitalism
(Cortada, 1998).
Freed from the emasculating powers of the corporation, new ways are having
to be found to attract and retain talent without the aid of bureaucratic careers,
which are judged to be inappropriate to the needs of individuals and
companies (Bridges, 1995; Arthur and Rousseau, 1996). This is believed to
generate new opportunities for jobs that offer excitement, creative fulfilment
and personal development. Work is the new consumption.
From this perspective there is an emphasis on expanding opportunities for
education and fulfilling jobs. A tightening bond is assumed between education,
jobs and rewards that highlights the technological imperative of individual
achievement. Although the spread of opportunities will lead to inequalities in
income and status, they reflect legitimate differences in talent, achievement
and contribution. Indeed, these inequalities create the necessary incentives to
ensure that the most talented are motivated to engage in intensive and
extensive periods of education and training (Davis and Moore, 1945).
For our purposes, it is interesting to note that widening opportunities within
education are not identified as a problem because the demand of skilled
8workers is assumed to increase, creating more room in the middle if not at the
top of the occupational ladder (a form of technological trickledown). This
obviously has an impact on the way the positional competition is understood. It
is a competition in the sense that all should be given an opportunity to express
their innate potential in comparison with others, rather than a power struggle
over access to education, credentials and jobs.
We also need to consider in more detail how the consensus view interprets
recent trends towards global integration, which has led to the view that
domestic competitions for education and jobs have become less relevant.
Good jobs can be achieved by most if not all if they can become a ‘magnet’
economy (Brown and Lauder, 2001) attracting a disproportion share of high
skilled, high waged jobs within the global labour market. Equally, widening
income inequalities are believed to reflect the value of human capital within a
global labour market (Reich, 1991).
This is not only seen to increase opportunities but to transform established
thinking about the link between opportunity and social justice. Given that good
jobs were in short supply and the education system was assigned the role of
deciding who should do what (at least in the limited sense of feeding the job
market with graded human products), the basis of opportunity was to give
people an equal chance to gain the top vocational prizes. This led to much
discussion about class, gender and racial inequalities in educational
outcomes. However, in the context of globalisation, such issues are seen as
secondary to that of raising overall standards of performance. The problem is
no longer one of equalising opportunities within domestic competitions for
education and jobs. The positional competition now depends on the relative
performance of national education systems. This presents an opportunity to
attract a disproportionate share of high skilled, high wages jobs within the
global marketplace if nations can succeed in outsmarting others (Brown and
Lauder, 2001). But it is also recognised that the role of government is limited
to providing all with the opportunity to enhance their employability, as national
governments can no longer guarantee employment in a competitive global
environment.
Positional Conflict Theory
If positional consensus theory focuses on the upgrading of skills and the
expansion of labour market opportunities for knowledge workers, conflict
theorists have traditionally focused on positional issues such as the
exclusionary tactics of elites and the reproduction of educational and
occupational inequalities. One of the most fruitful critiques of ‘positional
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Murphy, 1988). Here the competition for a livelihood is explained as a conflict
between groups of competitors, who will try to mobilise ‘power in order to
enhance or defend a group’s share of rewards or resources’ (Murphy, 1984:
548). This would apply to both the way status groups seek to monopolise entry
requirements into a ‘profession’ by restricting access, and to the way that
powerful social groups will attempt to structure the competition for places to
favour those with the appropriate cultural capital (Collins, 1979). The increase
in employer demand for ‘certified’ labour is therefore explained in terms of the
exclusionary tactics of professional enclaves seeking to restrict the number of
entrants to a given profession by raising entry requirements (Collins, 1979;
Friedson, 1986).
This focus is exemplified by Weber’s explanation of the popularity of
credentials in Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century:
‘When we hear from all sides the demand for an introduction of regular
curricula and special examinations, the reason behind it is, of course, not a
suddenly awakened “thirst for education” but the desire for restricting the
supply of these positions and their monopolization by the owners of
educational certificates. Today the “examination” is the universal means of this
monopolization, and therefore examinations irresistibly advance’ (Weber,
1945: 241-2).
The expansion of higher education is not believed to reflect changes in the
demand for high skilled workers, but credential inflation (Collins, 1979; Offe,
1976). The idea of credential inflation is akin to that of monetary inflation. If the
supply of money is greater than the supply of goods and services it leads to an
increase in the cost of those goods and services (inflation). In other words the
Euro in your pocket buys less. Equally, if more people gain the qualifications
previously required for professional or managerial jobs, and if the numbers of
these jobs does not expand to meet the supply of qualified people, there is
credential inflation. Where inflation occurs the exchange value weakens (Berg,
1970). As a result, ‘Students who want to get ahead are forced to go back to
school for longer periods, to get advanced degrees and professional
specializations. One can predict that the process will continue to repeat itself
at the more advanced level too. If in the future everyone had a Ph.D., law
degree, M.B.A., or the like, then these advanced degrees would be worth no
more that a job in a fast food restaurant, and the competition would move on
to still higher degrees’ (Collins, 1994:146). Credential inflation is also seen to
reinforce inequalities in opportunity because it will favour those with the
personal and family resources that are able to meet the costs associated with
an extended competition (Hirsch, 1977).
10
While these ideas make an important contribution to understanding positional
conflict they need to be modified and extended if we are to understand the
causes and consequences of the opportunity trap. Earlier conflict accounts
have under-estimated changes in the relationship between credential
competition and the occupational structure. Positional conflict theory also
needs to give greater attention to how positional competition is experienced by
individuals and social groups. Again Hirsch (1977) makes a useful distinction
between forms of positional power that derive from mobilising material,
cultural, and social capital to stay ahead in the race, from the mobilisation of
social groups seeking to change the rules of the game. Market power, for
instance, can mean the ‘command over economic resources in the
marketplace’ or ‘influence over markets (of a monopolistic kind)’ (p.153).
This distinction between competition ‘ranking’, that involves the use of
resources in the marketplace, and competition ‘rigging’ that focuses on
influences over markets (Brown 2000:637), assumes additional importance in
a context of economic globalisation. Indeed, the trend towards international
integration can itself be seen as an example of how power elites have
extended their influence over markets (Korten, 1996). The MNCs have been
the major benefactors of market deregulation as they are able to achieve
economies of scope and scale on a worldwide basis (Reich, 1991). But while it
has increased the market power of the MNCs, it challenges the power of
professional interest groups to rig domestic markets as they are exposed to
international competition. Moves toward the globalisation of professional
services including management consultancy, financial and legal services will
make it more difficult for the ‘professions’ to maintain monopolistic controls
over domestic markets. This is leading professional organisations to develop
international alliances with similar groups in other countries to find ways of
sheltering from increased competition. A consequence of the professional
classes feeling that their exclusionary powers over markets (rigging) are
threatened, is that it heightens the importance of being able to capitalise on
their material, cultural and social assets within ‘ranking’ tournaments.
We need to understand both rigging practices and ranking tournaments in
order to develop a comprehensive theory of the social structure of competition.
Such analyses need to include an understanding of how individuals and social
groups mobilise their cultural, economic, political, or social assets in positional
power struggles, whatever form they take. Within the English education
system, for instance, the shift from ‘meritocratic’ to ‘market’ rules (Brown,
1990; Ball, 1993), can in large part, be understood as a consequence of
middle class attempts to lift barriers that previously limited the use of material
and cultural assets in credential competitions. This does not give them
monopolistic powers that guarantee success, but it greatly increases their
chances of a high ranking. Thus rigging and ranking are not mutually
exclusive. Even if those who have the power to define the rules of the game
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are the most likely to win it, they still need to take part in order to develop their
intellectual capital and to proclaim the legitimacy of their success. When this is
applied to the competition for a livelihood, success for individuals and their
families is not guaranteed (Erikson and Goldthorpe, 1992; Devine, 1999).
Positional Conflict Theory therefore needs to show how positional
competitions are structured and how individuals and social groups fare within
the ‘rules of the game’. We need to incorporate the insights of other social
researchers such as Bourdieu and Bernstein.7 Bourdieu’s work on forms of
capital, for instance, offers important insights into how individuals and social
groups play-out a ceaseless competition for positional advantage in many
spheres of contemporary life (Bourdieu, 1986; 1998).
This approach remains firmly grounded in the neo-Weberian tradition that
rejects the consensus view of a politically neutral, open and fair contest within
education and the labour market in the advanced economies. The organisation
of positional competition will inevitably reflect a power struggle between
competing interest groups. This has led to significant variations in the way
competition rules are drawn up and how they relate to labour market
opportunities in different countries (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Brown, et al.
2001). It also recognises differences in the power of individuals and social
groups to deploy their material, cultural and social capital in the competition for
credentials and jobs. Finally, it also rejects the view that globalisation has
transformed the nature of opportunity and positional competition.
Theorising the Opportunity Trap
Taking this approach to the study of education, employment and the labour
market in the twenty-first century can throw conceptual light on the social
structure of opportunity and how this has changed over time. It can help us to
understand why positional conflict has intensified and why it cannot be
resolved through educational reform or economic globalisation. Our argument
is that as opportunities for education increase, they are proving harder to
cash-in. The problem is rooted in the relationship between capitalism and
democracy. The mass ranks of the middle classes and those from aspirational
working class families, have high hopes of what the knowledge economy has
to offer, fuelled by the expansion of higher education. At the same time people
are more dependent on the job market for their economic welfare as the gap
between winners and losers has grown (Frank and Cook, 1995). The problem
is that the labour market cannot keep pace with social expectations of work,
rewards, and status.
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The opportunity trap has exposed further limitations to individual freedom. To
be judged by our own efforts is sacrosanct in Western cultures, but our best
efforts are not enough. Even extraordinary efforts to improve one’s
performance will count for little if everyone else does the same thing. This is
something my university students understand. I recently asked them whether
they would prefer to gain a first-class degree along with half of all university
students in the country, or an upper-second class degree, if they were in the
top twenty-five percent of achievers. Only one out of over a hundred students
opted for the first-class degree, because they saw the necessity to gain an
advantage in the hunt for tough-entry employment.
What these students understand is that opportunity depends on the
opportunities of others. Absolute performance is not sufficient because
cashing in one’s opportunities depends on access to scare credentials, jobs,
and networks. For societies, this means that what can be offered to the
winners cannot be offered to the population as a whole. There are simply not
enough good jobs to go around. An important part of the attraction of elite
universities or blue-chip companies, is the fact that they offer social status and
life styles that are in short supply. They are sought after because they are
exclusive rather than inclusive.
Not Enough Good Jobs?
A major trend since the early 1980s has been an increased demand for
technical, managerial and professional workers and a more intensive struggle
for competitive advantage in education and the labour market (Brown, 1995;
2000). This does not negate the impact of credential inflation, but it recognises
that the absolute number of middle class occupations have increased, but
British data shows that this remains far below that required to meet current
demands (Falstead et al. 2002; Brynin, 2002).
The American and British economies have failed to raise skill levels
throughout the economy. They are characterised by enclaves of ‘knowledge’
work alongside large swathes of low waged, low skilled jobs (Brown, et al.,
2001:240). A recent study of work skills in Britain found that the proportion of
degree-level jobs rose from 10 per cent in 1986 to 17 per cent in 2001
(Felstead, et al., 2002). But is also found that whereas there are under three
million economically active people aged 20-60 who possess no qualification,
there are 6.5 million jobs that require no formal qualifications to obtain them
(2002:11) (See Appendix Figure:1).
Hence, although the relationship between credentials and jobs looks superficially
convincing (Appendix: Figures 2--4), what these figures do not show is increasing
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within-group differences, both in terms of the quality of employment and rates of
return. Moreover, if those with higher education continue to expand at the same
time that the demand for skilled labour weakens, returns may not be as clear-cut
as the rhetoric of ‘learning is earning’ would have us believe (Levin and Kelly,
1997; Wolf, 2002). Previous returns may not be an accurate guide to future
income. Indeed, data for the United States on education and income offers a
surprising finding. Much of the difference in financial returns from investments in
education does not stem from differential increases in income that conforms to
the human capital idea that learning pays, but due to the decline in the earning
power of non-university graduates. Figure 3 in the Appendix shows that while
educational levels have been improving in the U.S. many students at the end of
the 1990s were earning little (or no) more than they did in the 1970s.
Moreover, changes in skill requirements not only reflect an increase in
technological complexity but changes in models of organisational efficiency
and control (Thompson and Warhurst, 1998). The shift from bureaucratic to
flexible paradigms of organisational efficiency (Atkinson, 1985), does not
necessarily mean that workers are being given greater opportunities to use
their initiative and creative skills. The primary concern of employers is rarely
the release of the creative energies of the workforce but how to maintain
managerial control in flatter, leaner and more flexible organisations. The
inculcation of corporate mission statements, teamwork techniques and staff
appraisal schemes tied to remuneration, are all ways of controlling the work
force (Rose, 1999).
The power shift in the direction of knowledge workers has been greatly
exaggerated. Most ‘knowledge’ workers are only able to capitalise on their
knowledge within employment. They remain vulnerable to redundancy as the
recent cull of knowledge workers in Silicon Valley testifies. Power remains
decisively with the employers. As Georg Simmel (1990 [1907]) observed
almost a century ago, the freedom of employees is invariably matched by the
freedom of employers in a money economy. Therefore, while employees are
free to change employers, they are not free from the need to make a living in a
wage economy. In turn, the modern idea of employability frees employers from
the moral and social obligations to employees, and for white-collar workers
this means the provision of long-tenure career opportunities  (Fevre, 2003).
The insecurity that this imposes on the workforce greatly limits their sense of
freedom, precisely because they are not free from the necessity to earn a
living. In a buoyant labour market the balance of power between employees
and employers is disguised by a healthy supply of job opportunities, but when
the economy begins to slow and unemployment increases, the realities of
flexible labour markets are thrown into sharp relief. Even the winners now live
under a permanent stewards enquiry.
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Rising Stakes and Insecure Ladders
Differences in the life styles and life chances of winners and losers within
employment have always existed. But the race to inequality in the 1980s and
1990s in the United States and Britain has led to a dramatic increase in the
stakes.8 This is exacerbated by the obsession with waged work as the only
meaningful way to improve one’s life chances or expression of social
contribution. Rather than alleviate the problems associated with
unemployment the government has removed the safety blanket that offered
social welfare to the losers within the capitalist system. But the costs of failure
have been exaggerated by downgrading the quality of welfare support.
Equally, the ladder of opportunity is distinctly unstable. For much of the
twentieth century, when there was an economic downturn it was unskilled
blue-collar workers who bore the brunt of redundancies. The down sizing of
companies in recent decades has had a dramatic impact on the job tenure of
knowledge workers, including engineers, managers, administrators and
executives. They have experienced a democratisation of job insecurity, and
must now constantly defend their position if in employment. This is associated
with an intensification of work leading to a culture of long hours, and a lack of
clearly defined career opportunities (Sennett, 1998). This has not only left
them worrying about their own future but also that of their children. There are
few guarantees that children from the middle and professional classes will
maintain, let alone surpass, the social positions of their parents. Their
positions are not guaranteed. This is true for all categories of workers, who are
required to stay fit in their present job, if they have one, and to remain fit to
compete in the wider job market. This transforms the progressive idea of
lifelong learning, as the expansion of advanced programmes such as
professional doctorates, can be interpreted as an extension of the opportunity
trap.
Too Many Contestants
The qualitative shift in the nature of waged work is also coupled with the
problem of too many contestants chasing too few prized jobs. Mass higher
education and the decline of blue-collar work has led to rising expectations of
middle class life-styles. Giddens (1991: 6) has noted that ‘class divisions and
other fundamental lines of inequality, such as those connected with gender or
ethnicity, can be partly defined in terms of differential access to forms of self-
actualisation and empowerment’. But this depends on finding ways to exploit
their opportunities in education and the labour market, at the same time that
there has been an influx of serious contestants due to changes in the class
structure and gender relations (Crompton, 1999; Devine, 1999). The growth of
the middle classes since the 1950s has increased the proportion of the student
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population that not only aspired to a middle class career, but expect to make
one. This has served to intensify competition for the ‘best’ schools, colleges
and universities that are judged to give access to the most prestigious
vocational prizes.
In the United States there is evidence of the seriously rich attempting, and
succeeding, to rig inheritance laws to make it easier for them to pass wealth
onto their sibling. In a context of increasing positional competition they are
seeking to reproduce their advantage through wealth and ownership rather
than credential competition. This is not to say that they will not buy access to
elite kindergartens, schools, colleges and universities, as this is an important
source of cultural and social capital, but economic security has been bought in
advance. The extent to which this is happening and whether it represents a
precedent that other developed economies will follow remains unclear.
However, this is not an option for the middle classes that need to translate
their cultural advantage into ‘personal capital’ both in the form of ‘hard’
(credentials) and ‘soft’ (personal qualities) currency to be exchanged in the
market for jobs (Brown, et al., 2003; forthcoming). We previously noted that
credentials have become more important as employers have formalised their
recruitment practices, where certified knowledge is used as a basic screening
devise. This is clearly reflected in the transformation of elite education. It has
shifted from that of an elite ‘finishing’ school to that of a credential factory.
Access to marketable knowledge, certificates and networks, holds the key to
inheritance for the middle classes. They may inherit some material wealth but
usually this represents a fringe benefit. It pays for skiing holidays, a second
home or private education, but it is inadequate to support a middle class life-
style. This depends on a reasonable degree of success in the job market.
Failure for the middle class is not met with a material springboard, but poverty.
The middle classes have little option other than to capitalise on their cultural
assets via education, given the need to acquire credentials from tough-entry
schools, colleges and universities as employers introduced formal entry and
promotion procedures throughout the twentieth century (Bourdieu and
Bolanski, 1978).
For the lower socio-economic classes the limitation of inheritance is altogether
different. The digital divide, lack of money for books, cramped housing
conditions, and poor job prospects, placed them at a distinct disadvantage. A
commitment to equal opportunities and positive discrimination offers virtually
the only chance of breaking the cycle of disadvantage, through the formal
economy. The decline of bureaucratic work organisation has made the access
to credentials even more important, as there is less scope for occupational
mobility within the lean organisations of today.
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Competition has also become more intense as women are now encouraged to
compete on equal terms with men. Although inequalities in subject choices,
pay and promotion prospects remain, women, especially from middle class
backgrounds are serious contenders for professional and managerial
employment (Osborne et al., 2000; Crompton, 1999). The academic
performance of women, especially from middle class backgrounds has
intensified the competition for elite credentials (Arnot, et al., 1999).
This has made it difficult for Western governments to resist calls for wider
access to higher education. In an elite system of higher education the
possession of a graduate qualification represents a passport into professional
and managerial occupations. The recent move towards mass higher education
in a number of European countries has removed the problem of access to
higher education from middle class families.9 It has also opened new
opportunities to working class, 'mature' and ethnic minority students to gain
graduate qualifications. This has resulted in a significant increase in the
numbers of university graduates entering the labour market. But while the
expansion of higher education appears to extend access to professional and
managerial employment to more people, and raises expectations of middle
class lifestyles, ‘more means different’ as it has led to a greater differentiation
in the perceived ‘quality’ of both students and universities. In short, the rapid
expansion of higher education and lifelong learning is a symptom of the
opportunity trap, not its resolution.
The myth of globalisation and positional competition
Finally, the view that workers now have to operate in a global rather than a
national market is a simplification of existing realities for most workers. This is
because the global labour market does not operate as a ‘free’ market
(Castells, 1996; Held et al., 1999). Nationality continues to operate as a vital
tool for restricting the competition for jobs by excluding millions of well
qualified workers from other parts of the world such as skilled software
engineers from India competing for IT jobs within the European Community or
North America (Kobrin, 2000). These restrictions are sometimes loosened
when there are national labour or skill shortages, such as the current use of
H1B visas in the United States for IT workers, or the foreign talent scheme in
Singapore. This also applies at the other end of the labour market for those
who are willing to work as ‘guest’ workers to undertake the jobs that the
indigenous workforce are unwilling to consider given the long hours, poor
remuneration and bad conditions involved in a lot of this work (Sassen, 1988;
Fevre, 1998).
Moreover, there are already a number of bi-lateral agreements that extend
labour market opportunities (and risks) but these by definition are intended to
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limit the competition for human capital rather than to make it global in scope.
The free movement of labour is enshrined in the statutes of the European
Community, where people are assumed to be judged on the basis of their
knowledge, skills and experience. Graduates for Britain, France, Germany,
Spain and Portugal may find themselves in increasing competition for
technical, managerial and professional jobs in international agencies and
MNCs (Brown, 2000). But these graduates are largely sheltered from direct
competition from graduates from Moscow, Lahore and Beijing.
For most workers, most of the time, where they are born and grow-up
continues to structure their labour market opportunities within local or national
contexts. This does not mean that limitations on the physical movement of
labour undermine the importance of global economic trends. It is capital that
has  greater mobile than workers. Workers from different countries come into
competition based on market rules of inclusion and exclusion, when
companies make decisions about where to invest in new plants, offices or
research capability. These decisions will include a number of considerations
such as proximity to markets, political stability, transportation networks, social
overheads, wage costs, incentives in the form of cheap rents, tax holidays,
government grants and well as skill levels and the quality of education and
training.
Workers from different parts of the world also come into competition as a
collective resource rather than as individuals, not only in situations where
companies are deciding where to inwardly invest, but also in circumstances
where companies may be deciding to re-locate to another part of the world.
The fact that these decisions will be made on market rules is exemplified by
the problem confronting low skilled workers. In capitalist markets a successful
strategy to lift the skills base of the whole population may lead to low-skilled
jobs disappearing as the workforce is seen as too expensive or ‘over
educated’ relative to workers in developing nations (Wood 1994). However,
evidence shows that a large proportion of low skilled jobs in the service sector
are no more subject to the rules of international trade than the services they
produce, given that they are highly localised (Esping-Andersen 1999).
There is also little evidence to support the claim that income polarisation
reflects the operation of a global labour market (Freeman, 1994). This is
because the comparative evidence is very weak. In a global context it is to be
expected that all the leading economies would reveal the same pattern of
income polarisation, but in Germany, for instance, income inequality during the
1980s actually narrowed. A more plausible explanation is that it is those
countries that have adopted a neo-liberal agenda of social, political and
economic reforms including Britain and the United States, that have
experienced the race to inequality. Polarisation is therefore to be explained in
terms of how countries have responded to globalisation rather than in terms of
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a convergence based on the global value of human capital (Brown and
Lauder, 2001).
Hence, the consensus view of positional competition is politically
impoverished. Questions of social justice cannot be resolved through the
operation of the global labour market. Indeed, if the creation of a high skill,
high waged economy depends on a general upgrading of the skills of the
labour force, tackling the problem of domestic inequalities in income and
opportunities has become more rather than less important with economic
globalisation. Globalisation does not resolve the problem of domestic
positional competition. The rich and the poor are still related.  Access to elite
schools, colleges, and universities along with the credentials they bestow,
remains a key factor in determining future life chances. Therefore, the
question of social justice will continue to depend on how individual nations
states frame the competition for a livelihood.
Some Sociological Implications
The Hobbesian Condition in the Twenty-First Century
The opportunity trap highlights a tension at the heart of modern societies. We
have been brought up to believe that societies should be efficient and fair. We
want people in positions of responsibility to be properly trained and competent
at fulfilling their occupational roles. It is also deeply engrained in democratic
societies that all should have an opportunity to become a scientist, surgeon,
pop star, or president. Although this endorsement is muted when it is put in
terms of giving all an equal opportunity of being the person who empties the
garbage!
Whilst most people in liberal democracies would subscribe to this view, it may
directly contradict the interests of individuals and families. This problem stems
from a basic fact of life and death - it reflects the limits to inheritance.  Children
from affluent or wealthy backgrounds can inherit the car, television, house or
mansion, but they cannot directly inherit cultural capital. There will never be a
software package that parents can use to transfer all the knowledge and
experience that will be required to maintain, if not enhance, the social status of
family members.
This inherent tension between the interests of the family and  society has a
long history. In the seventeenth century Thomas Hobbes (1881; 1961) argued
that unless societies can find a cohesive force to bring people together they
confront an unending war of ‘all-against-all’. Hobbes believed that although
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humans may vary in terms of strength, ability or energy, such differences were
less apparent than their common human capabilities. The result is a constant
struggle between equals that offered little prospect of a solution. Hobbes
answer was to impose the will of the state as the only authority able to
command the obedience of the people.
Subsequently, the Scottish economist Adam Smith and the French sociologist
Emile Durkheim, had other ideas. They believed that the organisation of work
held the key to resolving the problem of social order. Through a commitment
to economic growth it was assumed that both efficiency and justice were
possible. Indeed, Durkheim argued that efficiency would come to depend on
extending individual opportunities to all.10 By matching individual capabilities to
work roles on the basis on personal achievement, everyone could agree about
the question of ‘who does what?’ and ‘who gets what?’ In short, he concluded
that ‘labour is divided spontaneously only if society is constituted in such a
way that social inequalities exactly express natural inequalities’ and this rests
on ‘absolute equality in the external conditions of the conflict’ (Durkheim,
1933:377). In the second-half of the twentieth century they seemed to be
vindicated. Old class antagonisms were destroyed as new opportunities for
education and skilled employment were extended to all classes. All social
groups appeared to benefit from improvements in productivity and the
expansion of white-collar work. This led Dahrendorf (1990) to conclude that
‘wherever possible, people will try to make headway by their own efforts. In the
United States, this has long been the dominant mode of conflict. Today the
same is true in most countries. Individual mobility takes the place of the class
struggle’ (p.159).
At the beginning of the twenty-first century the Hobbesian problem has
returned. Opportunity, rather than being the glue that bonds the individual to
society, has become the focus for intense social conflict. This is turn presents
a serious threat to efficiency, justice and social cohesion. Instead of a
normative commitment to equality of opportunity (Parsons, 1959) there are
civil knowledge wars, that have incited a scramble for tough-entry schools,
universities and jobs. The postwar commitment to ‘comprehensive’ education
has been sacrificed in the battle for positional advantage. The parents of elites
and the middle classes have mobilised whatever material or cultural resources
they can bring to bear on the outcome of the competition. The use of private
education, tutors, counsellors, and career specialists, has become de rigueur.
It is an expression of doing the best for one’s child, rather than cheating on
society. It has brought merit and the market into a head-to-head. In the age old
battle between family and merit described by Michael Young (1961) we can
see that the commitment to meritocracy has been defeated by a new form of
ascription, where millions are being excluded from any chance of receiving an
education that would allow them an equal chance of competing with the sons
and daughters of the wealthy. 11
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Rather than offering unprecedented opportunity and prosperity to all, we have
entered a zero-sum game where the winners take most, if not all. While
millions joined the paper chase for marketable skills and strive for a decent
job, many have failed to stay in touch with the democratic dream, while others
live in gratuitous affluence. But positional conflict has not only cast the rich
against poor, but has led to internecine struggles within the professional
classes (Brown, 1995; Ball and Vincent, 2001). The losers are not only the
disadvantaged who find themselves excluded from attaining a decent life for
themselves and family members, but also many of those from more affluent
backgrounds who may have done all they can to get ahead but have little to
show for their efforts. However, it must be remembered that in the opportunity
trap, some are more trapped that others. The extent of entrapment will
continue to reflect social inequalities in the power of social groups to rig
competition rules in their favour and to prosper in ranking tournaments.
This analysis also raises the question of whether social elites are increasingly
defining the competition for credentials and jobs in international, if not global,
terms. We cannot rule out the possibility that as the middle classes become more
aware of the opportunities and threats posed by economic globalisation, it will
lead them to mobilise resource to compete at a global level.
There are significant efforts being made to standardise the qualification
frameworks of different countries to give them greater comparability (OECD
1994; 1997). There are international bench-marked tests which offer a
comparison of student performance from different countries (Hirsch, 2002). In
the European Community a substantial number of students attend universities
in other Member countries as part of their undergraduate and postgraduate
studies, many universities offer distance learning programmes in other parts of
the world; and many students from Asia obtain their degrees by studying
overseas in North America or Europe (OECD, 2002; Appendix Figure 6). It is
currently estimated that 40 per cent of graduate students in engineering,
mathematics and computer sciences in the United States are classified as
foreign student (Johnson, 2001).
Polster and Newson (1998) suggest that arriving at international standards of
the performance and funding for universities ‘may allow for the creation of a
single global system’ which would permit the ‘production of a tiered higher
education system extending horizontally across countries as opposed to
simply vertically within them. A multilateral tiered higher education system may
be seen as a more efficient means of providing multinational corporations with
a smaller but more broadly distributed skilled workforce’ (p.180).
In the short-term these trends do not substantially alter the national character
of credential competition as previously noted. However, it is those elites who
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have been able to mobilise their material and cultural resources in the
acquisition of credentials and other personal qualities, on the basis of ‘market’
rules rather than being unencumbered by the demands of domestic
meritocratic competition, who are likely to benefit most in a global competition
for high skilled jobs.12 Competition systems based on meritocratic rules may
avoid some of the problems of polarisation in the domestic competition for a
livelihood, but social elites within these countries may feel that they are being
held back in the global competition, when compared to students in market
systems who have received intensive hot-housing as part of an academic elite.
Consequently, not only will market rules be endorsed by social elites who already
play by these rules, but the social elites from other countries such as Germany,
France and Sweden, may also press for the same rules if they are to maintain a
level playing field beyond their national boundaries. A consequence of market
rules being introduced into national education systems is that while it may lead to
greater equality between elites from different countries, it would increase
problems of social exclusion and polarisation within societies. Hence, if elites
from other developed countries follow the Anglo-Saxon model of market
education, there is the prospect of growing international class conflict, where
elites will seek to maximise their labour market power unencumbered by the
demands of the societies in which they live (Brown, 2000).
Credentials: The Currency of Opportunity
People are encouraged to invest time and effort to get qualified that will payoff
in terms of a good job and high incomes (Collins, 1994; Ashton and Green,
1996). Although academic success never came with a job guarantee,
restrictions on access to higher education gave university graduates the status
of a labour market elite. It has been argued here that the opportunity bargain
has been seriously strained if not broken. This has led to a spiral of inflation as
more enter the labour market with better grades and higher qualifications,
leading employers to lift their entry requirements in an attempt to reduce the
flood of applicants. But these inflationary pressures can lead to a different
outcome. For many jobs more advanced forms of education and training may
be seen as counter productive (i.e. too academic, specialised, or leading to
‘unrealistic expectations’). Rather than constantly lift entry requirements,
employers may increasingly differentiate in terms of the ‘quality’ of the
credential (this is rarely the case with money among people holding the same
currency). Does it, for instance, carry the imprimatur of an ‘elite’ or a ‘second
chance’ institution?
These inflationary pressures can also lead employers to place less emphasis
on credentials by extending their recruitment criteria.13 As one employer
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explained, ‘paper qualifications are the first tick in the box and then we move
onto the real selection’.14 Thus, there is a change in the way companies
appropriate credentials. Previously, they were seen as a certificate of cultural
suitability. However, employers argue that the kinds of people they are looking
for has changed and the credential tells them less about what they need to
know about a candidate when making their recruitment decisions. The
credential represented discipline, perseverance, and rule following behaviour,
highly valued in bureaucratic organisations. Now there is much greater
emphasis on personal drive, self-reliance, and interpersonal skills (Brown and
Scase, 1994).  The devaluation of credentials increases the value of barter
between the individual and the recruiter. For tough-entry jobs individuals not
only need the required credentials, but they must sell themselves to the
employer by demonstrating, through interview, psychometic tests and group
exercises, that they are more employable that other candidates (Brown et al.
forthcoming).
Opportunities do not come without responsibilities. Employability has been
introduced to bridge the chasm between education and jobs. It reflects the
devaluation of the academic currency. Credentials remain important but entry
into employment depends on broader personal qualities that are beyond the
state’s remit to control. Personal responsibility for employment is the price for
widening opportunities to education. Opportunities have to be paid for because
governments are finding it increasingly difficult to manufacture the connection
between credentials and jobs creation. Employability becomes an inevitable
feature of a knowledge-driven economy not because it reflects the high levels
of knowledge and skills required by most of the workforce and the demand for
rapid retraining and lifelong learning, but because mass higher education has
closed the knowledge gap. Differences in ‘knowledge’ between the higher
educated and other groups of workers has been used by employers to justify
differences in training, rewards and career development. The problem today,
as the participation rate in high education moves towards fifty percent, as is
already the case in a number of countries, is that many graduates may find
themselves in inferior jobs, despite having the same ‘knowledge’ as their
senior colleagues. This has weakened the differentiating power of knowledge
(credentials) in the legitimation of labour market and workplace inequalities.
We have entered a period of ‘educational stagflation’, where inflationary
pressures on credentials continues, at the same time the job market cannot
create enough of the jobs that many expect. However, is not necessarily a bad
thing from an employer perspective as flexible labour markets depend on a
reserve army of knowledge workers. As most of the employment growth is in
the service sector, university graduates are invaluable not because of their
knowledge of a particular field but because of their communication skills in
dealing with customers, although this is obviously not the case of all
graduates! However, the wages, jobs, and intrinsic rewards associated with
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many of these jobs are not commensurate with what university graduates
expect. The knock-on effect is that as more graduates are under-employed
opportunities for the less qualified becomes ever more limited (Berg, 1970;
Wolf, 2002).
New Strains of the Diploma Disease
Ronald Dore (1967) argues that the ‘diploma disease’ not only leads to
wasteful competition, but it infects the very purpose of liberal education. When
education is dominated by grading competitions,  ‘the pupil is concerned not
with mastery, but with being certified as having mastered. The knowledge that
he gains not for its own sake and not for constant later use in a real life
situation – but for the once-and-for-all purpose of reproducing it in an
examination. And the learning and reproducing is all just a means to an end –
the end of getting a certificate which is a passport to a coveted job, a status,
an income. If education is learning to do a job, qualification is a matter of
learning in order to get a job’ (1976:p.8).
We can therefore distinguish inquisitive learning from acquisitive learning.
Inquisitive learning is driven by an interest in knowledge and learning for its
own sake, whereas acquisitive learning is consumer driven. It involves
learning what is necessary to pass examinations. It is based on a model of
individual rational calculation where the moral foundations of education have
been lost (Lawn, 2001).
Since Dore’s original diagnosis of the diploma disease in the 1970s the
symptoms have worsened. Acquisitive learning is now widely believed to
define the purpose of education. There is a considerable wastage of effort and
resources as many compete for the prizes that only a few can achieve (Frank
and Cook, 1996). The opportunity trap lures people into ‘fashionable’ areas of
study at the same time that there are skill shortages in less popular fields often
based on science and engineering. But these are modest problems when set
against the individual and social costs associated with the social limits to
opportunity.
More and more effort, time and money is being spent doing what is necessary
rather that for any intrinsic purpose. Rather than  ‘opportunities’ extending our
freedom and fulfilling our dreams, they are making people increasingly self-
centred, stressed and unfulfilled. The pursuit of success harbours the danger
of turning the self into a commodity (Rose, 1999). If the diploma disease
signifies a shift in the purpose of education, employability is a shift in the
meaning of life. We are, in short, being economically enslaved by our
opportunities. It has been argued that even the winners now live under a
permanent stewards enquiry, as their positions are not guaranteed for life.
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One must enter a lifelong campaign to stay fit in one’s present job and to
remain fit in the wider job market in case one join the ranks of surplus
employees.
This has a significant impact on the way we bring-up our children. The priority
is to treat and train our children in ways that are demanded for success in this
new rat race, rather than in ways that benefit the child as an intelligent and
well-rounded member of society. Many of our young are ‘growing up absurd’
(Goodman, 1956). They now confront batteries of tests from the time they
leave their pushchairs; a lengthening obstacle course that extends into their
late twenties; and intense supervision giving children little room for creativity,
freedom or individual expression. We are creating hoards of smart
conformists. They know what they have to do to get ahead, but they have little
understanding of why they do what they are doing. In England, a student can
expect around 105 formal examinations before their eighteenth birthday.
At this point it is easy to miss the broader significance of the diploma disease.
For Dore, and others who cling to the idea of an aristocracy of talent, much of
the diploma disease reflects the ‘dumbing down’ of education and declining
standards as credentials are offered to those of dubious intellectual potential
(Murray and Herrestein, 1994). While there is clear evidence of credential
inflation, what the opportunity trap also reflects is a silent revolution. The
overheated competition for credentials and jobs reflects the fact that the
capabilities of a few have been greatly exaggerated, while those of the major
have been greatly underestimated. The opportunity trap reflects the fact that
the hierarchy of jobs does not conform to a hierarchy of talent as Durkheim
envisaged. Nor does the hierarchy of job holders give us much confidence that
it reflects innate differences rather than the product of class, gender, racial or
spatial inequalities in opportunities.
The opportunity trap can be explained by the economic limits to high skilled,
high waged employment rather than the innate limits of human capacities. It
exposes the dim view of intelligence for what it is, a social fiction (Brown and
Lauder, 2001).  It is the social rather than the human limits to opportunity that
represent the main problem in developed economies. The issue here is not
simply that some people may be better than others at some tasks, but that
academic study reflects general intelligence. This conflates relative
performance with absolute capability. Indeed, employers recognise that those
with the highest grades are not necessarily the ‘best’ employees. It is time to
rethink the basic assumptions that inform our understanding of justice,
opportunity and efficiency.
This conclusion also offers an explanation of why the educational and social
inequalities identified by social scientists have not had more profound
economic consequences. These inequalities have not seriously dented
25
productive efficiency because human capability is not in reality how it is
commonly understood, as characterised by a limited pool of talent, that places
a premium on getting the most talented into the most intellectually demanding
jobs. An alternative explanation is that with the appropriate cultural capital,
training and motivation, most people could perform most jobs reasonable well.
The problem this poses for the left is that it removes much of the economic
argument for social justice. The problem it poses for governments of all
persuasions it that the wealth of human capability that is being nurtured within
schools, colleges and universities, coupled with the explosion of knowledge
via new technologies and the internet, challenges the legitimation of how
capitalist democracies have resolved the questions of ‘who does what’ and
‘who gets what’. They have become victims of their own success!
Conclusion
The opportunity trap has become a defining feature of the risk society (Beck,
1992). The problem is not only how to find decent jobs but how to maintain them.
We have argued that people have been forced to depend on gaining a positional
advantage, as more and more people are chasing the same rewards and the
inequalities between winners and losers have increased.
The opportunity trap can be applied to governments was well as individuals,
groups, or classes. ‘Opportunity’ represented the democratic solution to the
distributional questions of what education, what jobs and what rewards. But what
looks like an extension to personal freedom, limits freedom. The division of
labour can no longer bear the aspirations of individuals, families and social
classes. Democracy has exceeded the limits of knowledge-driven capitalism as
‘opportunity’ has become disorganised (Lash and Urry, 1987).
Governments, especially in America and Britain, have not been passive
bystanders. They have pursued policies for over two decades that greatly
exacerbate the trends identified in this paper. They deliberately sought to
increase the stakes, given a blind commitment to market individualism. Some
conservative thinkers believed that greater market competition would attune
aspirations with available job opportunities and education would ‘diversify as
society required’ (Scruton, 1984). However, market reforms had exactly the
opposite consequence because they have made people more and more
dependent on credential competition. Equally, if the market is to be the arbiter
in the competition for a livelihood, there is little scope for the state to limit
access to credentials in the ‘national’ interest. In other words, the moral
foundations of opportunity, justice and efficiency have been reduced to the
logic of the market. What this leaves unresolved is that self-interest is not the
grass roots equivalent of the common good (Bell, 1953; Fevre, 2003). It then
becomes an act of faith that the number of decent jobs will grow
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commensurate with the supply of qualified people entering the labour market
(Brown, et al. 2001).
Equally, as governments focus on the supply side, the demand side becomes
increasingly beyond their control. Yet governments have been printing paper
qualifications at an alarming rate, in ways they could not do with money because
of the financial markets that take a dim view of inflation. In education there are no
such concerns. Indeed, the  increasing numbers of credentials in circulation is
seen to reflect widening of access and opportunities. But governments are
reluctant to admit that this has led to a growth in wasteful competition and a
weakening of the opportunity bargain, as they persist with the slogan ‘learning is
earning’. Yet we need to be wary of defining this as ‘over-education’ as it
smuggles in a utilitarian view of education, that its only purpose is to prepare
people for the job market or to increase lifetime earnings. It denies the value of
education and learning as an end in itself. The problem is that given the way we
have organised our life-support systems (work, incomes, dignity, quality of life),
these broader goals of education remain but lip-service in a world that hardly
exists.
This article also raises the issue of whether the opportunity trap, as characterized
here, is to be found in all the developed economies or whether there are
important national differences in the social structure of positional competition.
Moreover, it raises the issue of whether societal differences in competition rules
will converge or diverge from the Anglo-Saxon model. The prospect of enduring
societal differences in the way the competition for a livelihood is organised and
experienced needs to be fully explored in a context of increasing European and
global integration. However, comparative differences in university graduation
rates suggest that important differences remain in the organisation of education,
employment and the labour market. The graduation rate in German, for instance,
is far below that found in the United Kingdom or the Netherlands. The ‘dual
system’ in Germany channels large numbers of young adults into training
programmes that offer access to decent job opportunities without the requirement
of higher education. But whether the dual system can continue to perform this
role is a moot point (Streeck, 1997; Lauder, 2001).
In conclusion, we have shown that the opportunity trap is not simply an
educational problem but it does pose problems for education. The education
system reflects rather than ‘compensates’ for society (Bernstein, 1970). The
solution cannot be found within the confines of education, but requires little
short of a social revolution (Brown and Lauder, 2001). However, there is a
high degree of collusion with the rhetoric of ‘learning is earning’ within the
educational establishment, as schools, colleges and universities try to pursue
their own positional advantage in the competition for students, resources and
reputational capital. But unless a realistic re-evaluation of the role of
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education, efficiency and justice is mounted, another political denunciation of
the failings of education is inevitable.
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1 This is far removed from debates about the ‘diploma disease’ (Dore,1976;
Collins, 1979) and class reproduction (Bowles and Gintis, 1976) in the 1970s.
The ‘diploma disease’ highlights problems of credential inflation caused by the
failure of the jobs market to meet the rising demand for technical, professional
and managerial jobs, as educational opportunities have expanded (Berg, 1970).
It also focused on how the paper chase has undermined the ideals of a liberal
education as this article will go on to argue.
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2 Boudon (1973) was interested in the fact that the ‘distribution of social status
has changed less rapidly than the distribution of levels of education’ (1973: 4).
He draws on C. Arnold Anderson’s (1961) paper ‘A Skeptical Note on
Education and Mobility’ in  J. Floud and A.H.Halsey’s edited collection,
Economy, Economy and Society. Boudon notes ‘It is well known that all
industrial societies are characterized by a high level of inequality of
educational opportunity. Thus individuals who have a better educational level
are also more likely to have a better social background. But it is also more
difficult for them to reach a higher social status than their father, simply
because the father’s status is more likely to be high in the first place.’ (1973:
6).
3 The opportunity trap does not imply an equality of condition. Some are more
trapped than others. Social mobility for the working classes has, for instance,
long depended on gaining credentials, but in entering the competition for middle
class occupations they are forced to compete with those with significant cultural
and social advantages (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). Equally, the further they
advance the greater the social distance between themselves and family
members, in effect they are trapped between two cultures (Jackson and
Marsden, 1966). The inequalities of opportunity confronting those from
disadvantaged backgrounds has, if anything, worsened as education in England
and the United States is organised on the principles of ‘parentocracy’  rather than
‘meritocracy’ (Brown, 1995). This is an important dimension of the opportunity
trap because the more congested the competition for the ‘best’ school, colleges,
universities and jobs, and the more the middle classes are willing to ‘invest’ in
winning a positional advantage, the more difficult it will be for those from
disadvantaged backgrounds to achieve long-range social mobility (Halsey et al.,
1980). But the opportunity trap today is quantitatively and qualitatively different
from the competition for a livelihood in the past. It is the sheer scale of the
credential enterprise, most notably the expansion of higher education in countries
such as Britain, the Netherlands and the United States. There are far more
people still in the competition for profession and managerial work in their early
twenties, many of whom would have entered the labour market by their
eighteenth birthday in previous decades. This has created serious social
congestion that the labour market cannot clear (see below). In is also
qualitatively different in the way opportunities are now experienced. Opportunities
have not only become ‘individualised’ given an emphasis on self-reliance and
employability, but they have also become ‘disorganised’. Occupational careers
are more opaque and contingent. One is encouraged to create ones own
opportunities within institutional structures (education, work and the labour
market) that are more insecure and inherently risky. For example, the career path
associated with managerial jobs were laid out in advance, whereas the emphasis
in now on individual career management and self-development (Brown, et al.,
2003).
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A key feature of the opportunity trap is the idea that the competition for a
livelihood gives little choice as to how this is to be achieved. The entrepreneurial
route is by definition a high risk strategy which is most likely to succeed if it is
based on the acquisition of advanced technical knowledge and skills. However,
conscientious objectors are likely to be found at both ends of the social spectrum.
Some of  those from disadvantaged backgrounds will feel that the system has
been rigged to ensure their failure (Willis, 1977; MacLeod, 1995). As
disadvantaged social groups are dependent on the currency of credentials to
improve their live chances the consequences of educational failure is invariably
the reproduction of disadvantage. At the other end of the spectrum it can be
argued that the seriously rich, most notably in the United States where there are
plans for a significant reduction in inheritance tax, are seeking to reproduce their
advantage through wealth and ownership rather than credential competition.
4 The use of credentials as a currency of opportunity, depend on the individuation
of achievement (Trow, 1978). Within liberal democracies it is asserted that
educational and occupational selection should be based on individual
achievement rather than according to social class, gender or race. Formal
examinations were seen to offer an objective and universal standard for
assessing individual achievement rather than social background. Opportunities
were then extended throughout the class structure by giving all a chance to
follow the same syllabus leading to common examinations. However, the
purpose of ‘meritocratic’ competition was never equality but an equal chance to
be unequal (Young, 1961; Halsey, 1975).
5 Positional Consensus Theory contests this because they assert that the nature
of positional competition is transformed in a context of economic globalisation
(see below).
6 This interpretation of the relationship between education and employment
conforms closely to ‘technocratic’ theory (Kerr et al. 1973; Collins, 1979).
7 See, for example, the Special Issues of the British Journal of Sociology of
Education, Volume 23, number 4 (2002) devoted to the contribution of Basil
Bernstein.
8 The same trend has not been found in continental Europe, where neo-liberalism
is less evident.
9 The picture in Europe is uneven in terms of graduation rates. Figure 7 in the
statistical appendix show significant differences  between the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom as opposed to Germany. It highlights the importance of a
comparative perspective as the social construction of positional competition is
subject to importance variations (Lauder, 2001).
10 Marx of course had his mind set on revolution rather than reform.
11 As I have noted elsewhere, educational selection is increasingly based on
the wealth and wishes of parents rather than the abilities and efforts of
students. Here the equation, ‘ability + effort = merit’ is reformulated into
‘resources + preferences = choice’ (Brown, 1995; 2000).
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12 These differences in competition rules reflect contrasting social priorities.
Meritocratic rules, for instance, involve restrictions on the middle classes in the
use of their superior market power in the interest of social cohesion or state
legitimation (Brown, 2000).
13 Unlike money, credentials are not a currency of exchange but one of
entitlement. If you have the appropriate qualifications you are entitled to enter the
competition for specific kinds of employment.  It confers an entitlement to barter.
14 See Brown and Hesketh (forthcoming)
